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World
Introduction
Michael Vitiello*
Preparing an introduction for a symposium on United States v. Booker' is a
challenge. In its short history, Booker has generated substantial controversy and
2not just among scholars. For example, the political branches of government are
considering legislative action to undo Booker.3
Whether Booker will become a benchmark decision is an open question. In
the short term, the decision has dominated legal dialogue. Reactions to the
decision have included extravagant claims about the meaning of the decision. As
Professors Luna and Poulson observe in their article in this symposium, some
commentators were "'ecstatic"' and characterized Booker as "'a wise and careful
decision,"' while others have called the decision a "'disaster"' risking chaos in
the federal criminal justice system.4
Before offering an overview of this symposium, I want to offer a few
thoughts about why Booker has caused such shock waves. The starting point for a
* Professor of Law, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania,
1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. Special thanks go to my research assistants Jennifer Cecil and Justin C.
Wynne for their help with footnoting this introduction and special congratulations are due Jennifer Fordyce and
James Maynard, the law review's symposium editors who did an excellent job in assembling a panel of
distinguished scholars for this issue.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. There has already been significant scholarly attention to Booker. See, e.g., Robert J. Anello & Jodi
Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The Post-Booker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV.
9; Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death (and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
93 GEO. L.J. 395 (2005); Adam Lamparello, Implementing the "Heartland Departure" in a Post-Booker World,
2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 133 (2005); Symposium, The Future of American Sentencing: A National Roundtable on
Blakely, STAN. L. REV. (2004).
3. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the
American Bar Association House of Delegates (Aug. 8, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches
/2005/080805agamericanbarassoc.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (relating his fear that the post-
Booker sentencing system "will not be able to sustain the progress [the government has] made and victims may
be victimized once again by a system that is intended to protect them"). He goes on to advocate that Congress
adopt a minimum sentencing guideline system because "[iut would preserve the traditional division of
responsibility between judges and juries in criminal cases and retain the important function of the United States
Sentencing Commission in providing guidelines to the courts regarding sentencing. It would also allow judges
some flexibility for extraordinary cases." Id.; see also Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security Committee of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) (prepared
testimony of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, United States Sentencing Commission) (stating that the
Sentencing Commission has been holding hearings and considering different proposals to respond to Booker).
4. Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An Unexpected Benefit of
Booker?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 787, 787-88 (2006) (citations omitted).
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discussion of the case is the odd division within the Court. The case arose from a
drug sentence imposed under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").5
After the jury convicted Booker of possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute, the district court held a sentencing hearing in which it found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Booker was responsible for distributing a far
greater quantity of cocaine than the prosecution had proven to the jury.6 The
court's finding led to a term of imprisonment of almost one hundred months
longer than Booker would have received without the additional finding In
Fanfan, the companion case to Booker, the trial court found, in reliance on
Blakely v. Washington,' that enhancing the defendant's sentence would violate
the Sixth Amendment right to have the jury decide all facts that are determinative
of the appropriate sentence.9
Finding the holding in Booker requires parsing two opinions, with only
Justice Ginsburg joining both majority opinions.' Justice Stevens wrote what has
been called "the merits" opinion." As seemed certain after Blakely, Stevens'
majority found that the Guidelines were infirm: "Any fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum
authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 2
Perhaps not surprising in light of his service on the United States Sentencing
Commission, 3 Justice Breyer wrote the second majority opinion. 4 Labeled the
"remedial" opinion,'5 it severed two subsections of the Sentencing Reform Act
and held that those two provisions were invalid. 6 The most important result of
invalidating those two sections was to make the Guidelines advisory. And, as
agreed to by all nine Justices, a jury does not need to resolve facts in a system in
which guidelines are merely advisory. 17
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1 (c)(4), 4Al.1 (2005).
6. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
7. Id.
8. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
9. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
10. Id.
11. Kevin R. Reitz, Structure: The Enforceability of Sentencing Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 173
n.l (2005).
12. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
13. Justice Breyer served on the United States Sentencing Commission from 1985-89 when the
Commission was originally implementing the Guidelines. Cornell Law School, Supreme Court Collection:
Stephen Breyer, http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/justices/breyer.bio.html (Sept. 1994) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
14. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258.
15. Reitz, supra note 11.
16. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258-61 (invalidating 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)).
17 Id at 25R
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Court's sentencing decisions in unflattering terms:
Blakely cannot be grasped merely by a close reading of its separate
opinions. Indeed much of what is difficult about the case stems from a
cluster of closely related decisions the Court has handed down-and the
nonsensical interactions this body of precedent can have within the
Court's newly discovered Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. As things
stand, there are so many exceptions to the new safeguards announced in
Apprendi and Blakely-and many of them are important exceptions-
that we are left with a kind of constitutional "Swiss cheese. 25
Co-authors of an article in the Stanford Law Review concluded in a similar
vein that the Court has a "history of blunders and retreats" when it has
constitutionalized substantive criminal law. Their assessment of Apprendi and
Blakely is that, as in other instances when the Court has blundered, it will now
(hopefully) "more or less withdraw from the field. 26
One other theme is important for understanding the intensity of the response
to Booker. The point begs a brief historical diversion.
Beginning in the 1970s, a coalition of liberal and conservative commentators
mounted a challenge to the dominant indeterminate sentencing model in effect in
the United States at that time." Probably the single most influential voice for
sentencing reform was that of Federal District Court Judge Marvin Frankel.2' His
widely cited book Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order argued that current
sentencing practices were discriminatory and irrational, varying dramatically
from one judge to another. 29 He urged creation of a highly respected sentencing
commission that would develop specialized expertise and would be insulated
from direct political influence.0 Guidelines developed by the commission would
lead to greater consistency and procedural fairness.3
By the time Congress enacted legislation creating the Federal
Sentencing Commission, Republicans were in control of the Senate and crime had
become a partisan political issue.3 2 As summarized by one commentator, when
the Commission finally began its work, "Frankel's aims for the Commission
25. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2005).
26. Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, Institution: From Winship to Apprendi to Booker:
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 195 (2005).
27. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (discussing how the issue of federal sentencing
reform unified liberals, on the basis of antidiscrimination, with conservatives, on the basis of "law-and-order
crime control"); Michael Tonry, Purpose: The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 37, 40 (2005); Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011 (1991).
28. Tonry, supra note 27.
29. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
30. Tonry, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. ld.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
(political insulation and specialist expertise) and for the Guidelines (procedural
fairness and reduced disparities) were no longer in vogue."33 Resulting sentences
were harsher than anticipated when first proposed, influenced by the politics of
the day. Mandatory minimum sentences, especially for drug offenses, undercut
Frankel's vision for an independent sentencing commission.34
In addition to increasing the length of prison sentences, the Guidelines have
from their inception been unpopular with federal judges of all political
persuasions." They are notoriously complex, including a 258-box grid.3 6 As one
commentator has observed, judges and their clerks must sort through "a 629 page
guidelines manual with 1100 pages of appendices and more legalisms than
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce.'3 7 The extraordinary level of complexity has not led to
greater equity in sentencing but instead has led to greater sentencing disparity.
3
No doubt a result of the increased politicalization of crime and punishment, the
guideline system deprived judges of much of their discretion in departing from
the Guidelines as well.39 And that was before Attorney General Ashcrofte ° and
Congress got serious about "liberal" judges.
In February 2003, the Senate unanimously passed the Prosecutorial
Remedies and Other Tools against the Exploitation of Children Today Act
("PROTECT Act").4' The Act's main focus is the prevention of kidnapping and a
nationwide notification system (the "Amber Alert"). While this portion generated
33. Id. at 41.
34. Id.; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Purpose: Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the
Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 85 (2005) (arguing that disparity has increased under the Guidelines).
35. See Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992 ("[T]he
Sentencing Guidelines system is a failure - a dismal failure, a fact well known and fully understood by virtually
everyone who is associated with the federal justice system."); Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller. A More
Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of Guidelines Sentencing Reform Introduction, 58 STAN L. REV. 1, 2 (2005)
("[The Federal Guidelines] have been the subject of sustained criticism from judges, lawyers, scholars, and
members of Congress, and a wide consensus has emerged that the Federal Guidelines have in many ways
failed.").
36. Weisberg & Miller, supra note 35, at 16.
37. Alschuler, supra note 34, at 117.
38. Id.
39. See Frank 0. Bowman, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1322 (2005) (arguing that judges' broad discretion in sentencing fell into disfavor
during the 1970s and 1980s partly because there was an increase in crime and "mounting evidence that
prisoners were not being rehabilitated"). The author suggests that the unification of the congressional right and
left on the issue resulted in the creation of the Guideline system. Id.
40. After passage of the Act, Ashcroft made clear that the Department of Justice (DOJ) would take the
newly granted power seriously. See Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Sentencing Provisions, and the
Attorney General's Controversial Memo: An Assault Against the Federal Courts (Aug. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci 03_41 ?OpenDocument (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Ashcroft issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors explaining DOJ's policies on downward departures in
light of the PROTECT Act. Id. It states that prosecutors' "acquiescence" in downward departures should be a
"rare occurrence." Id. Furthermore, it requires that if a judge imposes a departure over the objections of the
prosecutor, the prosecutor must report the departure to DOJ within fourteen days. Id.
41. PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 17 Stat. 650-95 (codified in scattered sections of 18,
28, and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PROTECT Act].
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no controversy, an amendment proposed by Congressman Thomas Feeney did.42
Feeney's amendment targeted what he and its other supporters saw as a flawed
federal sentencing scheme that provided for the "long-standing and increasing
problems of downward departures" while leaving "upward departures virtually
nonexistent." 43 The expressed purpose of the Feeney Amendment was "to ensure
more faithful [judicial] adherence to the guidelines." It would impose "strict
limitations on departures by allowing sentences outside the guidelines range only
upon grounds specifically enumerated in the guidelines as proper for departure. 45
This would "eliminate ad hoc departures based on vague grounds."'
The PROTECT Act made several sweeping alterations to federal sentencing
law. It mandated a de novo appellate standard of review for all departures from
the Guidelines. 47 This replaced the more limited due deference standard
established by the Supreme Court in Koon v. United States.48 Additionally, it
created a variety of cumbersome reporting requirements for the judiciary. For
example, it required sentencing judges to offer a written statement justifying all
departures exceeding twenty-four months in duration.4 '9 Furthermore, within thirty
days of judgment, the law required the chief judge of each district to provide a
report, to be made available to Congress or the Department of Justice, including
extensive information about the case. s°
The Act also instructed the Attorney General to report certain details to both
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, including the facts of the case, the
judge's identity, and the stated reasons for departure from the Guidelines.5'
Finally, instead of guaranteeing at least three positions for federal judges on the
Federal Sentencing Commission, which was previously required, the Act limited
the number of federal judges on the Commission to no more than three5 2
42. Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing Guidelines After
Blakely: A Former Commissioner's Perspective, 2004 BYU L. REV. 935, 948.
43. Jared I. Heller, Comment: Do Judges Need Protection?: Legislative and Judicial Responses to the
PROTECTAct's Feeney Amendment, 68 ALB. L. REV. 755,762-63 (2005) (citing 149 CONG. REC. H2422 (daily
ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney)).
44. Id. at 763.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(2); Heller, supra note 43, at 764.
48. 518 U.S. 81,97-98 (1996).
49. PROTECT Act § 401(c); 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(1) (2000); Heller, supra note 43, at 764.
50. The report must describe:
[T]he sentence, the offense for which it is imposed, the age, race, sex of the offender, and
information regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines ... [and] shall also include-(A) the
judgment and commitment order; (B) the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed... (C) any
plea agreement; (D) the indictment or other charging document; (E) the presentence report; and (F)
any other information as the Commission finds appropriate.
PROTECT Act § 401(h)(w)(l).
51. Id. § 401(l)(2); Heller, supra note 43, at 765.
52. PROTECT Act § 401(n); Heller, supra note 43, at 765.
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Not surprisingly, the Feeney Amendment faced extensive criticism from the
federal bench, defense attorneys, and numerous public interest groups. 3 Judges
resented the Amendment's many restrictions. Not only did it require district courts to
justify their departure decisions in writing, it also granted broader appellate review of
downward departures. Furthermore, it limited the composition of the Sentencing
Commission to a maximum of three judges and instructed the Commission to enact
new guidelines to ensure a reduction of downward departures.54 Adding to the
criticism was "the widely-held impression that [the Act] hastily passed through
Congress without the benefit of public hearings and with very little debate on its
potential consequences for sentencing law. 55
"An already difficult situation has been made worse by Congress's recent
passage of certain provisions ... [of] the PROTECT Act of 2003," Judge Myron
H. Bright of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit wrote in his
concurring opinion in United States v. Flores.5 6 "[T]his enactment will exacerbate
the problems with the Guidelines by making it even more difficult for district
judges to do justice under the law as circumstances warrant."57
Judge Rodney S. Webb of the United States District Court for North Dakota
summarized many of the criticisms of the Guidelines system generally and the
Feeney Amendment specifically, in United States v. Dyck:
We must adopt sentencing goals beyond retribution and deterrence. Our
current system costs too much and we are in danger of losing a
substantial portion of a whole generation of young men to drugs as their
futures rot within our prisons. A society can be tough on crime without
being vindictive, unjust or cruel. We must encourage flexible and
innovative sentencing such as drug courts, drug treatment and supervised
probation as an alternative to prison. Change is hard, but change is not
impossible. Judges and others involved in the criminal justice system
must speak out against unjust and unwise mechanisms of justice such as
strict guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences."
53. Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 948.
54. Id. at 949-50.
55. Heller, supra note 43, at 759.
56. 336 F.3d 760, 768 (8th Cir. 2003).
57. Id. He further stated:
I want to conclude by making a plea to the district judges of this country who feel that they should
have some say and some discretion in sentencing. Let your opinions disclose your views about the
injustice in the sentencing decision or decisions you are obligated to impose by Congressional
mandate and/or the Sentencing Guidelines.
Let me say further that judges generally do not object to appropriate guidelines for sentencing
decisions but the time has come for major reform in the system. I say in this concurring opinion, as I
have said in other sentencing opinions that I have written, "Is anyone out there listening?"
Id.
58. United States v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022 (D.N.D. 2003).
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Criticism came from across the political spectrum. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin
said she had never before seen "judges of all political stripes so willing to go
public over such a highly political matter." District Court Judge John F. Keenan
has proclaimed, "I'm a Republican, but I don't think this is good legislation ....
I don't know of any federal judge who thinks it's a good idea."59
Meanwhile, at least two United States Supreme Court Justices, Anthony
Kennedy and the late William Rehnquist, criticized the Guidelines and the
Feeney Amendment. "Our resources are misspent, our punishments too severe,
our sentences too long," said Rehnquist to the American Bar Association at its
annual meeting in San Francisco.60
Soon after Congress enacted the PROTECT Act, Chief Judge Marilyn Hall
Patel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
attacked the PROTECT Act and Ashcroft memo in United States v. Mellert:
Under this new regime not only will the government determine the
charges to be filed, whether the indictments will undercharge or
overcharge the criminal conduct, or, whether it will engage in pre-
indictment or post-indictment maneuvering to bring about the
government's desired result, but it also will be the only voice heard when
adopting statutory sentences and Sentencing Guidelines with less and
less discretion afforded to the courts and the Sentencing Commission. To
put it more bluntly, the wisdom of the years and breadth of experience
accumulated by judges and the Sentencing Commission in adjudicating
criminal cases and sentencing defendants is shucked for the inexperience
of young prosecutors and the equally young think-tank policy makers in
61the legislative and executive branches.
Patel continued, quoting Judge Guido Calabresi of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit:
"[A]n independent judiciary which applies rules of law... is a pain in
the neck to any government that wants to get things done." The judicial
branch should not be timid nor fearful of inflicting an occasional
whiplash or, where necessary, even imposing chronic pain when
Constitutional rights are threatened or the balance of powers is
jeopardized.62
59. Heller, supra note 43, at 772.
60. Linda Satter, Judges in a Stew on Federal Sentences, Guidelines Seen as Too Rigid, Unfair, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE, Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci 03_42?Open
Document (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
61. No. CR 03-0043 MHP, 2003 WL 22025007, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003).
62. Id.
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Former United States Attorney John S. Martin cited the PROTECT Act and
its reporting requirements as integral to his decision to retire after thirteen years
as a federal district judge. He explained in the New York Times that the
Guidelines hinder judges in their ability to calculate fair sentences, and he "no
longer want[ed] to be part of our unjust criminal justice system.6 3 Martin stated
that when he became a judge, he "accepted the fact that [he] would be paid much
less than [he] could earn in private practice" because he "believed [he] would be
compensated by the satisfaction of serving the public good-the administration
of justice." However, he stated that such optimism was "replaced by the distress
[he felt] at being part of a sentencing system that is unnecessarily cruel and
rigid."64
Some critics described the reporting requirement as a judicial "black list,"
with at least one court labeling it "an unwarranted interference with judicial
independence and a clear violation of the separation of powers set forth in the
United States Constitution." 65 Specifically, Senator Edward Kennedy suggested
that the reporting requirements will create a "blacklist" of federal judges who
make downward departures, and Democrat John Conyers of the House Judiciary
Committee called the requirement a "'scary' effort to assemble an 'enemies list'
of lenient judges."'6 Additionally, the late Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that
the reporting requirement would "seriously impair the ability of courts to impose
just and reasonable sentences. 67
Furthermore, Judge Paul Magnuson of the United States District Court of
Minnesota wrote in United States v. Kirsch, that Congress' goal was to intimidate
judges from departing from the Guidelines. He argued further that:
The reporting requirement has another, more invidious effect. Although
the Court has a high regard for the Assistant U.S. Attorney who
prosecuted this matter, there will be other cases in which the prosecutor
will misuse his or her authority. Due to the requirement of reporting
departures that is now in place, Courts are no longer able to stop that
abuse of power. The reporting requirements will have a devastating
effect on our system of justice which, for more than 200 years, has
protected the rights of the citizens of this country as set forth in the
Constitution. Our justice system depends on a fair and impartial judiciary
that is free from intimidation from the other branches of government.
63. Amie N. Ely, Note: Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum's
Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to "Seek Justice", 90 CORNELL L. REV. 237, 253-54 (2004) (citing United
States v. Mendoza, No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004)).
64. John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,2003, at A31.
65. Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 945-51.
66. Ely, supra note 63, at 254.
67. Id.
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The departure reporting requirements constitute an unwarranted inti-
midation of the judiciary.65
Judge Sterling Johnson, Jr. of the Eastern District of New York and former
Commissioner to the United States Sentencing Commission, "issued a wide-
ranging order that directly contradicts the [Feeney Amendment's] provision
granting Congress more direct access, without the need for judicial permission, to a
variety of case documents," prompting the New York Times to describe it as
"perhaps the boldest criticism of the [Feeney Amendment]" yet.69 In defiance of the
law's provision allowing for congressional inspection of case documents, Judge
Sterling ordered all his case documents sealed. Johnson stated that his order was
within his legitimate judicial authority, because while "Congress has the authority
to make law, .. . federal judges have the authority to seal documents in cases over
which they preside." 70 According to Judge Johnson, "[a]t some point you have to
take a stand. If Congress wants to make a deck of cards for the judges like they did
for the bad guys in Iraq, then make me the ace of spades."7'
Additionally, the Judicial Conference of the United States voted to urge the
repeal of significant provisions of the PROTECT Act. At the time, the Judicial
Conference was a twenty-seven-member body headed by the late Chief Justice and
included the chief judges of the United States Courts of Appeal and a district judge
appointed for a minimum of three years from each circuit. The judges criticized the
law because it "severely limits the ability of trial judges to depart from the
Sentencing Guidelines and requires reports to Congress on any federal judge who
does so." They urged Congress to repeal the Feeney Amendment measure ordering
the Sentencing Commission to release files with judge-specific information to the
Attorney General and opposed the requirement that the Justice Department give the
Judiciary committees judge-specific downward departure information.72
I do not want to leave the impression that Booker has resolved the controversy
surrounding the Guidelines and the Feeney Amendment. For example, Professor
68. United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1007 (D. Minn., 2003). Other judges raise similar
concerns. For example, Judge Roger P. Patterson, Jr. of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York wrote in United States v. Kim:
In their latest attack on the third branch of the government, Congress not only attempted to restrict
the ability of trial judges to impose fair sentences based on the particular facts presented in each
case, but also... required that the Department of Justice report to Congress all cases in which the
trial judge departs from the guidelines in non-cooperation cases. Evidently, Congress sought to deter
any departures by the implicit threat to trial judges that, if they are considered for appellate positions,
they will be subjected to the type of demeaning and unseemly treatment which nominees to the
courts of appeals have undergone at the hands of Congress in recent years.
No. 03 Cr. 413(RPP), 2003 WL 22391190, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2003) (citations omitted).
69. Ian Urbina, New York's Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003,
at B 1.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Mark Hamblett, Federal Judges Attack Sentencing Restrictions, Judicial Conference Calls for
Repeal of Feeney Amendment, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 23, 2003, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/
legislation/ci 03_44?Open Document (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Reitz has cautioned that "Booker has reduced the mandatory character of the Federal
Guidelines, but the degree of change should not be overstated."73 As a number of
commentators have argued, Booker has not rendered the Guidelines meaningless. 74
Nonetheless, one other way to understand Booker is to see it as the Court's effort to
reclaim some territory from Congress and the Executive.
My opening remarks are intended to suggest why Booker has garnered so
much attention. It is more than a symptom of a divided Court. Instead, it
highlights the conflict among the three branches of government. But Booker has
not ended the debate. It leaves open questions whether Congress will or should
respond. For those of us concerned about congressional overreaching in the area
of criminal sentencing, perhaps a positive consequence of recent scandals in
Washington is that those scandals have diverted energy and attention from
sentencing law.7"
I do not know whether Booker will remain an important question in the long
term. But in the short term, it is an extraordinarily important decision. The major
importance of the McGeorge Law Review's symposium is to allow us to
speculate about the post-Booker landscape. The law review editors have
assembled a distinguished group of scholars to explore that landscape.
Our first presenter, Professor Diane Courselle, fleshes out a number of
important themes reflected in Booker. 6 After she describes "The Road to
Booker," she explores what Booker and the cases leading to it tell us about the
Court's ambivalence towards juries.
For Courselle, cases like Apprendi are grounded in the notion that the jury is
a bulwark against "'oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers.' 77 The Court
decided Apprendi and its predecessor, Jones v. United States, after a wave of
state sentence enhancement statutes that increased both the length of criminal
sentences and legislative control over the length of those sentences.7" Abandoning
a formal distinction between "elements" of the crime and sentencing factors
allowed the Court to extend the right to have a jury determine the facts necessary
to trigger the sentencing enhancement.79
Extending the right to a jury in such circumstances may be costly and
impractical. Further, even in Blakely, the dissent pointed out alternatives that
73. Reitz, supra note 11, at 156.
74. See, e.g., Norman C. Bay, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World, 37 McGEORGE L.
REV. 549, 551 (2006); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Under-Appreciated Value of Advisory Guidelines, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 577, 586-87 (2006).
75. See generally David Westphal, Bush's Hold on GOP in Congress Weakens, SAC. BEE, Feb. 26,
2006, at Al (discussing the recent controversies that have caused the previously loyal Congress to openly
criticize the President, such as the failed ports deal, the domestic eavesdropping program, the new Medicare
drug program, and the failed Miers nomination).
76. Diane E. Courselle, Slouching Toward Booker and Beyond-The Court Embraces and Rejects the
Role of Juries at Sentencing, 37 McGEORGE L. REV. 513 (2006).
77. Id. at 517 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 515.
79. Id. at 517.
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were less attractive than mandatory guidelines. For example, under the Court's
precedent, a state might return to a scheme whereby judges were left with
unfettered discretion-the situation that prevailed prior to the move towards
guidelines. 80
Courselle then develops numerous instances in which the Court has shown
distrust of juries, including instances in which it has found juries unable to
determine sentences or civil sanctions.8' Booker may well be understood as
another instance in which the Court, or at least the curious split within the Court,
shows its ambivalence about the capacity of lay jurors.
In Making Sense of Apprendi and its Progeny, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky
examines the bewildering distinctions that the Court has made in its Apprendi-
Sixth Amendment case law and tries to bring coherence to the field.82 As he
observes, each of the distinctions in that line of cases "seems arbitrary and highly
questionable."83 He explains the distinctions by reference to the shifting
majorities, almost always five to four, with the shift of one Justice responsible for
the Court's holdings. " Given this array, I confess awe with Chemerinsky's
efforts to make sense out of this line of cases.
Anyone familiar with Chemerinsky's impressive body of work should not be
surprised that he does a credible job of bringing a semblance of coherence to the
Court's case law. He finds in Apprendi and its progeny a simple proposition that,
"under the Sixth Amendment, it is wrong to convict a person of one crime and
sentence that person for another., 85 Thereafter, the first section of his article
makes a strong case that that is exactly what the Court had in mind in Apprendi
and why that is an appropriate rule of law.
86
The remainder of his article explores several areas of Supreme Court
jurisprudence that would have to be rethought if the Court were to acknowledge
the simple proposition that explains Apprendi. For example, among the several
points that he makes, he argues that using acquittals as a basis for sentencing
enhancements would violate double jeopardy; that Booker's distinction between
advisory and mandatory guidelines must fall;88 and that a court cannot impose a
mandatory minimum sentence without submitting the question to the jury.
89
80. Id. at 521.
81. Id. at 521-26.
82. Erwin Chemerinsky, Making Sense of Apprendi and its Progeny, 37 MCGEORGE L. REv. 531
(2006).
83. Id. at 531.
84. Id. at 531-32.
85. Id. at 532.
86. Id. at 533-36. He acknowledges that his interpretation leaves open how the Court should analyze
what constitutes a crime. Id. at 536. As he stated during his presentation at our live symposium, that is a
difficult question but the subject of another article.
87. Id. at 537-40.
88. Id. at 540.
89. Id. at 541-42.
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Chemerinsky's expectations for the Court may seem quixotic, especially for
a Court that has been so deeply divided for so long.' But both the fact that two
new Justices are on the Court, and the fact that so many of the cases discussed in
Making Sense of Apprendi were five to four decisions, make his thesis worth
testing. Given Chemerinsky's impressive history of pro bono litigation, I have no
doubt that he will be called on, at a minimum, to submit an amicus brief
advancing his thesis.91
Perhaps not surprisingly, Professor Norman Bay, formerly the United States
Attorney for New Mexico, is interested in exploring prosecutorial discretion
under the Guidelines and Booker.92 He starts by exploring how the Guidelines
changed the balance of power between judges and prosecutors and then considers
the extent to which Booker alters that balance.
Bay reminds us that judges lost the discretion they had exercised in an
indeterminate sentencing regime and that prosecutors gained power under the
Guidelines.93 The power that "prosecutors have always had in making charging
decisions" was amplified by the Guidelines. 9' "Real offense" sentencing also
enhanced prosecutorial power because prosecutors influence this process through
the evidence they introduce as relevant conduct.9 In addition, he argues that
prosecutors also hold the key to sentences below what might otherwise be
imposed by the applicable Guidelines range.96 Finally, indirectly, the sheer
complexity of the Guidelines may add to prosecutorial power.97
Bay's article poses an important question: now that the Guidelines are
advisory, how has Booker affected prosecutorial discretion?98 In theory, the
Guidelines are no longer mandatory and prosecutors have less power to control
sentencing. But stealing a line from Mark Twain, Bay contends that "reports of
the demise of prosecutorial discretion have been greatly exaggerated." 99
Prosecutors retain great power, in part, because of important limits on
Booker's reach. Booker left untouched many aspects of prosecutorial discretion.
They still possess the power to select charges for indictment. Even without the
Guidelines, prosecutors can file charges that carry mandatory-minimum
90. See generally TUSHNET, supra note 18.
91. See, e.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). In this case, Chemerinsky served as appellate
counsel to the petitioner.
92. Bay, supra note 74.
93. Id. at 555-56.
94. Id. at 556.
95. Relevant conduct rules require the district court to consider the actual offense conduct, including
facts that may not have been specified in the indictment or established as elements of the charged offense.
While courts have long had this discretion, under the Guidelines, once the judge makes the requisite findings
she must take them into account at sentencing. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.3 (2005).
96. Bay, supra note 74, at 557.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 550.
99. Id. at 551.
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penalties.'0° Prosecutors also "retain the power to grant substantial assistance
motions and the power to introduce evidence at sentencing to argue that a
defendant's relevant conduct ought to result in an enhanced sentence."'0 '
Similarly, prosecutors retain their plea bargaining power.'0 2
Prosecutors' power also remains intact because sentencing courts are likely
to deviate from the Guidelines sparingly. District courts must still consult the
Guidelines, and while the law is emerging, "a Guidelines sentence is a safe
harbor of sorts," likely to be found reasonable by the appellate courts.' 3
Furthermore, "judges may be acculturated to the Guidelines," especially those
judges who have known only the Guidelines regime. °' Moreover, federal judges
are "apt to use their discretion carefully so as to avoid giving the impression of
judicial overreaching," especially in light of their awareness of Congress' interest
in the subject.'
5
Bay also argues that bargain theory helps explain why Booker's reach may
be limited in some cases. Although downward departures have gotten most of the
attention, judges may depart upwards from the Guideline-recommended
sentence. '°6 Even more so than before Booker, parties must evaluate a sentencing
judge's predilections. Uncertainty enhances risk; risk may create more pressure
to enter into a plea agreement. There may be an increase in prosecutorial
discretion "on an ad hoc basis in a post-Booker world, for a defendant may fear
receiving a sentence at the statutory maximum."'07
His article ends with a question about the future: the wild card in all of this
post-Booker analysis is what Congress will do now that the Guidelines are
advisory. He concludes that legislative action should not be driven by concern for
the post-Booker loss of prosecutorial discretion. "Otherwise, the Guidelines and
Booker may give rise to the most unwarranted and ironic disparity of all: concern
for federal prosecutors and executive power, rather than the overall fairness of
the criminal justice system and sound sentencing policy."'08
100. Since the Guidelines were first enacted, Congress has passed a slew of statutes that impose
mandatory-minimum penalties. There are over 100 of these statutes and their constitutionality is not in question.
Independent of the Guidelines, they provide prosecutors with a significant amount of leverage, particularly with
respect to charging decisions and in plea bargaining. The mandatory minimum laws trump the Guidelines so, a
Guideline sentence cannot be '"less than any statutorily required minimum sentence."' Prosecutors continue to
possess charging discretion that determines if a defendant will be subjected to a mandatory minimum penalty.
Id. at 562-64 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 561.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 575.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 564-65. As he observes, post-Booker statistics compiled by the United States Sentencing
Commission reveal that judges are, in fact, following the Guidelines in the majority of cases, though at the low
end of the historical compliance rate. By and large, most sentences fall within the relevant Guidelines
sentencing range.
106. Id. at 575.
107. Id. at 575-76.
108. Id. at 576.
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In The Under-Appreciated Value of Advisory Guidelines, Professor Erica
Hashimoto reviews the history of the Sentencing Reform Act'°9 and contends that
Congress failed to make clear why it chose mandatory rather than advisory
guidelines."0 Her thesis is intriguing: she argues that not only are mandatory
guidelines not warranted today, but that they were unnecessary even in 1984."'
Her position challenges the conventional wisdom that judicial discretion was
exercised arbitrarily. Further, her article argues that Congress should reverse
Booker by imposing mandatory sentences." 2
Hashimoto starts with the unusual political coalition that resulted in the
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act. As she summarizes the point, "in 1978,
the convergence of interests of liberal senators concerned about sentencing
disparity and conservative senators concerned about overly-lenient judges
resulted in the passage, by a vote of ninety-one to one, of the Sentencing Reform
Act as a part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1984.""' The House Judiciary
Committee opposed the bill because the bill included mandatory guidelines."
4
Only by attaching the bill to an appropriations bill needed to avoid government
shutdown did Congress enact the law."5
In light of Booker, Hashimoto asks whether mandatory guidelines are
necessary." 6 She reframes her inquiry as follows: if mandatory guidelines were
necessary in 1984, perhaps they remain appropriate today. But her thesis is that
they were unnecessary then and remain unnecessary today."7
She argues that the concerns that drove the passage of the Sentencing Reform
Act, sentencing disparity and leniency, did not result from intentional decisions
by judges to impose disparate and lenient sentences but from a lack of guidance
from Congress."8 Not only were sentencing provisions open-ended," 9 but the
sentencing judge lacked data on what other judges would do in similar cases
nationwide.' 20 While Congress enacted open-ended sentencing provisions, it
neither articulated a guiding philosophy nor specified relevant sentencing
factors. 2'
109. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 (b)(1)).
110. Hashimoto, supra note 74, at 577.
111. id.
112. Id. at 588.
113. Id. at 580 (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. Id. Professor Hashimoto also describes more recent efforts in the PROTECT Act to limit the ability
of judges to make downward departures from Guideline sentences. Id. at 581, 586-87.
116. Id. at582.
117. Id. at 582-83.
118. Id. at 583.
119. Professor Hashimoto gives the example of a judge faced with a statute, such as the provision
punishing the robbery of a federally insured bank. The judge could impose a fine and/or up to twenty years in
prison. Id. at 583-85.
120. Id. at 584.
121. Id. at585.
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The case for mandatory guidelines is even weaker today than in 1984. The'
Sentencing Commission collects and disseminates the data that was lacking prior
to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act. 22 Further, Hashimoto argues that
the fact that judges in the post-Booker era continue to adhere to the Guideline
sentences shows that any fear of undue leniency is unfounded. 123 Implicit in
Hashimoto's article is that we are better off without another battle between the
legislative and judicial branches and that Congress should leave well enough
alone. 24
Despite the prospect that Congress will undo some of Booker, Congress
cannot change its constitutional holding. As with any major holding, Booker
leaves in its wake numerous possible future legal challenges. Attorney Benji
McMurray explores some of the potential legal challenges now available to
defense attorneys in reliance on Booker.
For years, courts held that the Confrontation Clause did not apply at sentencing
but Booker and another recent Supreme Court case, Crawford v. Washington,2 ' have
prompted defendants to raise the question again. 126 Crawford rejected longstanding
precedent regarding the Confrontation Clause and Booker held that the mandatory
application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
Read together, they suggest that the Court should reconsider the traditional view that
the Confrontation Clause does not apply at sentencing.
1 7
McMurray examines the era of indeterminate sentencing, motivated largely by a
rehabilitative ideal. He finds significant that, during this period, circuit courts
"discussed confrontation as a due process right rather than looking to the text of the
Confrontation Clause."' 2s In the time period before the passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act,'29 judges had broad discretion to use virtually any facts before them as
the basis to impose a sentence within the statutory range. 30 By comparison, the
Sentencing Reform Act had the effect of turning federal sentencing hearings into
adversarial proceedings where judges hear testimony to resolve contested facts that
have predictable consequences for a defendant's sentence.131
122. Id.
123. Id. at 586-87.
124. Id. at 588.
125. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 413
F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Rigdon, 2005 WL 1664454 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stone,
432 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown,
430 F.3d 942 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGuffin, 2005 WL 1526109 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142 (11 th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D.W. Va. 2005).
127. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability of Crawford
at Sentencing After Booker, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 589,590-91 (2006).
128. Id. at 595.
129. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
130. McMurray, supra note 127, at 597.
131. Id. at 600.
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Decided shortly before Booker, Crawford held that "testimonial hearsay"
could be admitted only if (1) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross
examine the declarant and (2) the declarant was unavailable to testify at trial.'32 In
response to both Crawford and Booker, circuit courts are now considering
whether the Confrontation Clause, as interpreted in Crawford, applies at
sentencing. So far, the circuit courts have unanimously held it does not.'
3
Despite that fact, McMurray offers several reasons why the federal courts
should reconsider the question. First, the holding that the Sixth Amendment does
not apply to sentencing hearings ignores the text of the Sixth Amendment. "Like
a runner who misses third base, the holding [that dismisses the Sixth Amendment
in a single line] cannot stand until courts return to touch the bag.' 34 Because no
court has grappled with the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, circuit courts
should welcome the opportunity to resolve this issue in the wake of Crawford
and Booker.
Second, Booker made clear the Sentencing Reform Act did turn sentencing
into mini-trials. "In light of Booker, there can be no doubt that the [Sentencing
Reform Act] turned federal sentencing into the type of hearing where the 'full
panoply' of trial rights was required, 'including the right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against [the defendant]."" 35 Booker demands that the
courts reexamine the relevant precedent because the previous cases, which held
that the Confrontation Clause is inapplicable under the Sentencing Reform Act,
reached the opposite conclusion.'
3 6
Third, precedent is based on an erroneous understanding of the Confrontation
Clause. Crawford "marks a fundamental shift in the Supreme Court's
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence"'37 and therefore, courts should reconsider
prior holdings that stem from the previous understanding of this right.'38
Finally, precedent is based on now-rejected sentencing policy. Rather than
rehabilitation, the focus of sentencing policy is now on measured proportionality
between the crime and the punishment and mathematical uniformity between
apparently similar cases. Because of shifts in policy, "courts ought to ask whether
their precedents adequately take into account current attitudes about the theories
of punishment."'39
Professor Michael O'Hear also raises a post-Booker legal issue.' 40 Since the
passage of the Sentence Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ("(a)(6)") has
132. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
133. McMurray, supra note 127, at 590 n.5.
134. Id. at 606.
135. Id. at 610 (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (1966)).
136. Id. at610-11.
137. United States v. Solomon, 399 F.3d 1231, 1237 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).
138. McMurray, supra note 127, at 612.
139. Id. at 614.
140. Michael M. O'Hear, The Duv to Avoid Disparit: Implementing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) After
Booker. 37 McGEORGE L. REV. 627 (2006).
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required sentencing judges to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar conduct."' 4 ' O'Hear argues that despite litigation of issues arising under
(a)(6), appellate courts have failed to give a systematic account of the origin and
purpose of the provision.
O'Hear outlines four different circumstances in which (a)(6) has been
invoked post-Booker to justify a non-Guidelines sentence. Together, these cases
exhibit the potentially far-reaching consequences of a revived (a)(6) juris-
prudence. The four types of circumstances include: ensuring similar sentences for
similarly situated co-defendants; mitigating federal-state disparities; mitigating
inter-district disparities; and rejecting Guidelines provisions that create
disparities. 42
O'Hear develops a foundation for a framework by analyzing the text and
legislative history of (a)(6).
The (a)(6) duty to avoid unwarranted disparity appears in a list of several
matters that the "court, in determining the particular sentence to be
imposed, shall consider." The mandatory "shall" indicates that the court
must consider these matters. [But the] use of the term "consider"
suggests that the court is not required to give determinative weight to
any particular factor.
4 3
He concludes that "analysis of the language and structure of the statute
suggests that the judiciary is authorized to make an independent evaluation-that
is, independent of the Commission and the Guidelines-of what sorts of
disparities are unwarranted."'"
O'Hear argues for a two-step (empirical-normative) analysis. As to the latter,
(a)(6) asks sentencing judges (1) to determine, for each case, the sentences that
have been imposed in similar cases and (2) to avoid unwarranted disparities
relative to the outcomes in those similar cases.
4
1
In a post-Booker world, (a)(6) "adds a distinct new factor to the sentencing
calculus: the national average sentence imposed in other cases in which a
defendant with a similar record was convicted of the same or similar offense."'
141. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 (a)(6)).
142. O'Hear, supra note 140, at 629-33.
143. Id. at 633 (citation omitted).
144. Id. at 635.
145. Id. at 640-45. Both steps in the analysis present important difficulties. These include defining the
baseline for comparison and determining if the disparity is unwarranted. However, "[t]his approach both
provides a framework for judges to evaluate Guidelines sentences in a critical fashion (as they are plainly
authorized to do under Booker) and imposes constraints on the ability of judges to assume an open-ended
policy-making role (as the SRA plainly did not intend for them to have)." Id. at 628.
146. ld. at 645.
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This factor may have a meaningful role to play. First, the articulation of a number
at the start of the decision-making process may play an important role in shaping
the final outcome. If the national average sentence is routinely identified as
salient, it might offer an alternative anchor and encourage a more open-minded
approach to sentencing. 147 Second, because (a)(6) focuses on the offense of
conviction, it suggests that sentences based on other factors must be specially
justified.148 Third, (a)(6) does not allow individual judges to make sentencing
policy in derogation of the Commission's role, but it does allow judges to apply
their personal wisdom and experience. 49 In sum, (a)(6) may be important in
counterbalancing the statutory mandate for judges to "consider" the Guidelines
and in ensuring the advisory Guidelines are truly advisory. 5
Professor O'Hear's thesis overlaps with the last four articles in the
symposium, roughly grouped under the heading of Rethinking Sentencing Post-
Booker. As indicated above, 5' unlike most constitutional holdings, Booker leaves
room for congressional action. That is so because prior case law would allow
Congress to set mandatory sentences, removing the role for the jury.'52 And given
the confrontational atmosphere that may help explain the result in Booker,'
53
Congress may act.'54 Short of that, lower federal courts are necessarily resolving
issues in Booker's wake on an ad hoc basis. As a result, the symposium
profitably explores the post-Booker landscape.
Professor Deborah Young explores the extent to which and how district
courts have embraced their new freedom under Booker.'15 Despite some
comments by judges to the contrary, sentencing pursuant to Booker is not the
same as it was in the discretionary world of pre-Guidelines sentencing. Today's
freedom in sentencing is moderated by the advisory Guidelines and by appellate
review for reasonableness. Within these parameters, the decisions made by
district courts offer insight into what works in federal sentencing and what needs
reconsideration. 
56
Young's examination of post-Booker cases illustrates how trial courts have
interpreted and applied Booker. Because of Booker's lengthy, two-part majority
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 647.
151. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
152. Bay, supra note 74, at 640-42 (stating that Congress has enacted hundreds of mandatory minimum
sentences and the constitutionality of these is not in question).
153. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
154. See Seth Stem, House Moves on Anti-Crime Packages, CQ WKLY, Mar. 10, 2006 (noting that after
Booker, mandatory minimums have taken on a "new urgency" for republicans in Congress because they believe
that judges will use the ruling "as a basis for issuing lower sentences").
155. Deborah Young, The Freedom to Sentence: District Courts After Booker, 37 McGEORGE L. REV.
649 (2006).
156. Id. at 649.
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opinion by two different Justices, lower courts must interpret a great deal of
contentious language. Her article discusses the major issues that have developed
for district courts in the wake of Booker: "[H]ow much deference district courts
should give the Guidelines, how Booker has renewed consideration of previously
resolved disputes about sentencing procedures, and the major areas where judges
are choosing to give non-Guidelines sentences.' 57
While some commentators argue that the lack of a coherent sentencing
philosophy to guide federal sentencing law dooms the scheme to failure, Young
contends that, at least in the short run, federal district court judges with extensive
experience applying the Guidelines can offer important insight into how the
system ought to work.' s Further, she urges the administration, the United States
Sentencing Commission, and Congress to consider the voices of these district
court judges. 5 9
Professor Young identifies differences among lower court judges in their
post-Booker cases.' 6° Despite those differences, statistical analysis of post-Booker
sentences does not show significant changes, such as a pattern of shorter
sentences where judges have used a higher burden of proof, declined to consider
acquitted conduct, and exercised discretion in other ways that decreased a
defendant's offense level. 16'
Young argues that despite the circuitous route from mandatory guidelines to
Booker, we have come close to the ideal of reform advanced by Senator Kennedy
and many others in the 1970s. 62 Congress now has the opportunity to consider
that the freedom to sentence under a reasonableness standard with advisory
guidelines has not yielded dramatically different sentences than those under the
Guidelines. 63 The best information for determining whether advisory guidelines
will work for federal sentencing is by allowing judges to continue to sentence in
the current post-Booker model for a significant period of time. District courts can
provide a dialogue for Congress and the Commission while case law can develop
through the appellate process. '64 The reform movement of the 1970s stressed the
need for standards to use as a benchmark, while still allowing individualized
sentencing. 165Furthermore, it was recognized that appellate review of sentencing
157. Id. at 650.
158. Id. at 649-50, 687.
159. Id. at 650.
160. Her review of the case law indicates that judges differ on what weight to give the Guidelines, what
standards should be applied for fact-finding at sentencing, where courts believe the Guidelines impose, rather
than reduce, disparity, and what factors the courts believe are inadequately considered in the Guidelines. And,
in all of these cases, there remains the tension between the Guidelines' goal of imposing consistent sentences
for similar conduct and tailoring a sentence to fit an individual's circumstances, which was the judge's role for
so many decades before guidelines sentences. Id. at 687.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 687-88.
163. Id. at 688.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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could serve to promote uniformity. '66 For the first time, district courts now have
guidelines, appellate review, and the freedom to sentence.
Like Professor Young, Professor Myrna Raeder sees Booker as an important
opportunity for positive law reform. She lays out her thesis clearly: while the
Guidelines were never entirely successful in producing identical sentences for
men and women, the effort to do so "imposed draconian costs on families as well
as on women who do not resemble the violent male drug dealers who inspired the
severe federal drug penalties.' 67
Raeder develops important differences between men and women, both in
terms of their criminal conduct and what she calls major operational issues
concerning most women's prisons.' 6' For example, women offenders do not
present discipline, security, and escape concerns associated with male prisoners.
Instead, they need physical and mental health care and treatment for substance
abuse and trauma. '69 As a result, she argues, gender neutrality in sentencing
fosters inequality.'70
Raeder identifies special concerns of women, for example, pregnancy and
childbirth, that should be treated as relevant to sentencing.'7' So too are privacy
concerns and sexual misconduct in the correctional settings.'72 She believes "that
Booker's reasonableness analysis provides the flexibility to approve non-
Guidelines sentences based on gender-related factors and caution[s] against
interpreting the advisory guidelines as a straitjacket that confines the analysis of
the reasonableness of non-Guidelines sentences."'7 3 She concludes by hoping
"that nonviolent women offenders can obtain the treatment to enable them to
reunify with their children and succeed in the community. If not, we are likely to
face.., an 'orphan-class' of children who are at risk of following in their
incarcerated mothers' footsteps.' 74
166. Id.
167. Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines World, 37
MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 692 (2006).
168. Id. at 697.
169. Id.
170. Id. at691.
171. Professor Raeder suggests such arguments be based on fundamental rights to privacy, birth, and
family. She also suggests that we place child related concerns in the broader global context of international
human rights, similar to emerging arguments against practices leading to sexual misconduct in a prison setting.
Id. at 741-42.
172. For example, Professor Raeder argues that placement of female offenders under the supervision of
female correctional officers should be a sentencing factor for women who have been previously sexually
abused. Id. at 744-56.
173. Id. at 692-93.
174. Id. at 756.
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In White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie
Ebbers Too Harsh?, Professor Peter Henning uses the sentence imposed on
former WorldCom CEO Bernard Ebbers as a case study for understanding
Booker and the special issues arising under the Guidelines dealing with white
collar crime.'75
The district court sentenced Ebbers a few months after the Court announced
its decision in Booker.'76 Recognizing that Ebbers' sentence was close to what he
would have received under a mandatory regime, Henning uses the case "to
consider where sentencing may go in the future for white collar crime cases by
asking whether the twenty-five-year term handed down... , which will require
the sixty-three-year-old Ebbers to spend most, if not all, of the rest of his life in
prison, was too harsh.' 77
White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker explores special features of the
typical white collar criminal. Henning identifies a certain tension in white collar
criminal cases. For example, white collar defendants are often "from middle- and
upper-class backgrounds [and] quite often, [are] much like the judges imposing
the sentences in terms of education, community involvement, and lifestyle.' 78
They are often older than their blue collar counterparts.179 Those factors may
influence judges to impose lighter sentences than otherwise warranted.
The Guidelines limited the ability of judges to base white collar sentences on
those kinds of considerations. The white collar executive of a publicly traded
company who puts the company at risk or causes significant investor losses may
have been subject to a "death sentence" under the Guidelines.'80 Moreover, except
when a defendant is elderly and infirm, the Guidelines do not permit a departure
based on age.18'
175. Peter J. Henning, White Collar Crime Sentences After Booker: Was the Sentencing of Bernie
Ebbers Too Harsh?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 757 (2006). "Ebbers' sentence of twenty-five years in prison for
securities fraud and making false statements in submissions to the Securities Exchange Commission "was one
of the most severe given to a first-time offender for a crime that did not involve violence or trafficking in illegal
narcotics." Id. at 757.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 769.
179. See id. at 766; see also DAVID WEISBURD & ELIN WARING, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL
CAREERS 33 (2002) (noting that offenders convicted of street crime generally receive their first conviction when
they are in their teens, while offenders convicted of white-collar crime were arrested for their first crime at an
average age of thirty-five).
180. Henning, supra note 175, at 766.
181. Id.
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With those tensions in mind, Henning argues that we cannot determine
whether Ebbers' sentence, which came in below what the Guidelines would have
permitted, was "too harsh" without a benchmark for determining what is an
appropriate sentence in a white collar crime case."" Henning states:
His sentence in large part conformed to the Sentencing Guidelines based
on the judge's loss calculation and consideration of the relevant factors
for a downward departure. That begs the question whether the
Sentencing Guidelines provide for appropriate sentences for white collar
crimes, or whether sentencing under section 2B 1.1 is itself too severe for
the types of offenders who come within its scope.183
At the core of Henning's argument is that the single most important factor in
white collar sentencing is the calculation of the loss, which, in the WorldCom
case, was based on a determination of the harm suffered by investors from the
revelation of fraud.' 84 While various other factors may have a small effect on the
offense level for a white collar defendant, calculation of the loss suffered by
victims can measure the harm caused by the defendant and serve as "'a gauge of
the defendant's guilty mind.""85 In light of the importance of the question of loss,
he urges that the question be remitted to the jury.86
Henning also addresses whether, "under an advisory Sentencing Guidelines
system, the problem of disparity will creep back into sentencing, and if so, what
are the possible responses."' 8 7 He suggests that if discretionary sentencing in
white collar crime cases results in inappropriately lighter punishments, Congress
might mandate minimum sentences for offenses.18  Henning argues in favor of a
mandatory minimum sentence for fraud offenses tied to the jury's loss
determination. That would enhance the jury's role because its factual
determinations would be related directly to the sentence imposed on the
defendant.
89
As a result, Henning
recommends that Congress amend the primary federal fraud pro-
visions.., by making loss (or gain) an element of the offense to ensure
the jury's role in sentencing, advanced in Apprendi, that allows it to
182. Id. at 783.
183. Id. at 784.
184. Id. at 763, 766.
185. Id. at 767 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 772.
187. Id. at 758,772, 777-83.
188. Id. at 778-83.
189. Id. at 779-80,783.
2006 / Introduction
make the crucial factual determination that will affect the defendant's
sentence in a white collar crime prosecution. "°
While the remedial portion of Booker eliminates any constitutional
requirement for juries to decide loss (or gain), shifting loss from a
sentencing factor to an element of the offense would result in a
proceeding that is more consistent with the Sixth Amendment
requirement of having a jury [determine loss. This] would limit, although
not eliminate, a source of potential sentencing disparity that may creep
back into federal cases under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.' 9'
Henning is concerned about the federal judiciary reverting back to "a system
in which the personal predilections of the judge determine the outcome of the
sentencing" because it is too easy for judges to identify with the white collar
defendant.'92 As a result, he argues for a means to require some baseline
consistency in sentencing. Because Booker no longer makes the Guidelines
mandatory, imposing a mandatory minimum sentence may be the best way to
assure consistency in fraud cases.' 93
Finally, in Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An Unexpected Benefit
of Booker, Professors Erik Luna and Barton Poulson argue that Booker creates an
opportunity for a fundamental change in the federal approach to punishment.1
9
4
Their forward-looking article explains what restorative justice is, how it might be
implemented in federal courts, and why criminal justice actors and others should
support the concept of federal restorative justice.
Restorative justice incorporates all stakeholders in a given crime, including
the offender, the victims, family members, and affected community
representatives, when deciding how to respond to the crime and what
consequences should flow from the crime."' Restorative justice recognizes that a
successful criminal sanction must be backward-looking and forward-looking, as
it not only condemns the offense and seeks to uncover its causes, but also
facilitates moral developments and pro-social behavior in the offender. '
96
Restorative justice rests on three basic principles that distinguish it from
traditional attitudes toward punishment. First, it actively involves victims.
197
Second, a core premise is that the offender makes amends for the offense.'99
Finally, all of the stakeholders are committed to the sanction.' 99 Advocates of
190. Id. at 758, 772-77.
191. Id. at 773.
192. Id. at 777-84.
193. Id. at 757.
194. Luna & Poulson, supra note 4.
195. Id. at 789.
196. Id. at 789-90.
197. Id. at790-91.
198. Id. at 791.
199. Id.
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restorative justice contemplate that, through deliberation, the stakeholders reach
agreement on how to heal the victim and the community and how to facilitate the
offender's development as a law-abiding citizen.2 The success of restorative
justice is premised on the offender's genuine admission of guilt and fully
201informed participation of all of the parties .
Booker opens the door for new and progressive options beyond the
Guidelines. Luna and Poulson urge that we incorporate restorative justice
programs. 22 Participants in the federal system may be influenced by empirical
support that restorative justice programs work. For example, they reduce fear." •J. • 201
experienced by victims and lower the rate of recidivism.
The authors recognize that restorative justice may not be appropriate for all
federal offenses.20' They also realize that proponents of restorative justice face
significant challenges in advancing their agenda. For example, they must
overcome the status quo in the federal criminal justice system.' No doubt, Luna
and Poulson see their participation in a symposium like this one as a start for, as
they argue, restorative justice activists will need to educate judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and probation officers about the benefits and feasibility of
"restorativism. '2 6
By way of conclusion, I find among the symposium articles some
disagreement about whether the Court would have served the justice system
better by applying Blakely to the Guidelines.207 But I read the articles as reflecting
a couple of broad themes upon which consensus emerges. No one urges that
Congress unravel Booker by enacting mandatory minimum sentences or
otherwise trying to overrule Booker legislatively. Insofar as the authors urge
congressional action, they urge deference to the judiciary28 or legislation that
would adopt innovative sentencing options, rather than simply adding to the
severity of existing penalties.2°9 Other authors argue that Booker has created room
200. Id. at 795.
201. Id. at 794-95. Luna and Poulson also discussed the procedural informality often associated with
restorative justice. The typical model uses non-adversarial, informal procedures and provides the participants
with a degree of process control over place, time, and format. Moreover, the programs tend to empower those
people directly affected by the crime. They provide for open discussions of their feelings and ideas, with the
victim explaining how the crime has affected his life, and what will make it better. This adds to a collaborative,
consensus-based decision-making process. These programs seek to reintegrate the offender back into the law-
abiding community. Id. at 795-815.
202. Id. at 812.
203. Id. at 798-99. Beyond the already demonstrated benefits, restorative approaches may be able to do
more. Restorative justice may be able to improve perceived control, problem solving skills, social integration,
and perceptions of procedural justice, each of which, in turn, has a documented connection with mental health.
Id. at 802-07.
204. Id. at 812-13.
205. Id. at 798, 819-11.
206. Id. at 811.
207. Compare, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 82, at 534-42, with Young, supra note 155, at 687-88.
208. See, e.g., Young, supra note 155.
209. See, e.g., Luna & Poulson, supra note 4.
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for lower courts to improve current excessive sentencing practices under the
Guidelines by using the discretion created by Booker.2' No doubt, all of the
symposium writers share the concern that the political arena is a too heated venue
in which to make sound criminal sentencing policy."'
210. See, e.g., Raeder, supra note 167; O'Hear, supra note 140.
211. We do not have to look far to find examples of legislators who seek political gains by bashing the
courts. In a recent speech, retired Justice Sandra Day O'Connor shot back "at Republican leaders whose
repeated denunciations of the courts for alleged liberal bias could.., be contributing to a climate of violence
against judges." Julian Borger, Former Top Judge Says US Risks Edging Near to Dictatorship, GUARDIAN,
Mar. 13, 2006, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,,1729396,00.html (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
